The Braggart’s Dilemma: On the Social Rewards and Penalties of Advertising Prosocial Behavior

Public displays of generosity are ubiquitous. People often signal their generosity to others by wearing t-shirts or announcing their good deeds to wide audiences on social networking sites. One reason it is surprising to see so many people advertise their good deeds is that there exists a strong norm to be modest about prosocial behavior. Further, individuals go to great lengths to communicate to that their good deeds are not motivated by self-interest (Ariely, Bracha & Meier, 2009). However, successfully demonstrating generosity has positive returns on reputation (Flynn, 2003), making it appealing to publicize one’s good deeds to others. We examine the role of bragging about prosocial behavior on attributions of generosity. We expect that bragging communicates that an actor has done a good deed, but also signals that the actor was motivated by selfish desires. Thus, an individual whose good deeds are unknown to others will be seen as more generous when he brags, because it informs others of his prosocial behavior. However, an individual whose good deeds are already known to others will be seen as less generous when he brags, because bragging no longer provides new information about his behavior, and instead signals that his actions were motivated by reputation concerns.